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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROCKVILLE CENTRE VILLAGE CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13686 
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF ROCKVILLE 
CENTRE, 
Respondent. 
AXELROD, CORNACHIO & FAMIGHETTI (WAYNE J. SCHAEFER of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
CULLEN AND DYKMAN (GERARD FISHBERG Of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Rockville 
Centre Village Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. 
(Association) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
on an improper practice charge filed by the Association against 
the Incorporated Village of Rockville Centre (Village). The 
Association alleges in its charge, to the extent relevant to its 
exceptions, that the Village violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
subcontracted parking meter repair work after severing the 
employment of two unit employees who had done that work. After a 
hearing, the ALJ granted the Village's motion to dismiss, which 
Board - U-13686 -2 
had been made at the end of the Association's direct case.^ 
The ALJ dismissed the allegations regarding the subcontracting of 
meter repair work on two grounds. First, the ALJ held that the 
charge in that respect was untimely because some meter repair 
work had been subcontracted at least a year before the charge was 
filed. Reaching the merits, the ALT held alternatively that the 
Association had failed to demonstrate exclusivity over parking 
meter repair, again because some of that repair work had been 
done by a private subcontractor. 
The Association argues that the ALJ erred in dismissing the 
charge pursuant to the Village's motion because the record 
evidence does not conclusively establish either the untimeliness 
of the charge or the lack of exclusivity when that record is read 
most favorably to the Association, as it must be when considering 
the Village's motion.^ The Village argues that the ALJ's 
decision is correct and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the ALJ's decision in relevant part and 
remand for further proceedings regarding the parking meter repair 
allegations. 
Both grounds for dismissal of the parking meter repair 
allegations were based largely upon the testimony of John Bacon, 
the Village's Highway General Supervisor. The ALJ concluded that 
^The ALJ adjourned the hearing sine die after the motion was 
made. 
^See, e.g., County of Nassau. 17 PERB 53013 (1984). 
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the charge in this respect was untimely because Bacon testified 
that meters had been repaired by a contractor during the time 
that unit employees were also doing that work. Bacon also 
testified that he recalled seeing, before May 1991, a package on 
his desk from a private contractor which contained repaired 
parking meters. 
When considering the timeliness of a charge, the inquiry is 
to the charging party's knowledge, actual or constructive, 
regarding the conduct constituting the claimed impropriety. The 
inquiry is whether the charging party knew or should have known 
of the conduct alleged to constitute the improper practice more 
than four months before the date the charging party files its 
charge. Bacon is not an officer or agent of the Association; he 
is not even in the Association's unit. At the stage of the 
proceeding at which the charge was dismissed, there was nothing 
in the record that would compel a conclusion that the 
Association, through any of its authorized officers or agents, 
knew or should have known that parking meter repair had been 
subcontracted more than four months before it filed the charge in 
July 1992. Indeed, the testimony from the Association's 
president, Glenn Hudson, which was not discussed in the context 
of the timeliness dismissal of this aspect of the charge, was 
that he first became aware of meter repair being contracted in 
May 1992, when he read an article in a publication issued by the 
Village. If measured from that date, the charge is clearly 
timely. Our reversal of this part of the ALJ's decision is not a 
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determination that the allegations regarding transfer of meter 
repair are in fact timely, only that the charge cannot be 
concluded at this point to have been untimely filed. 
Our conclusion is the same with respect to the ALJ's 
dismissal on the merits, which rests on the conclusion that the 
Association failed to establish exclusivity over parking meter 
repair. Bacon's testimony, and the other parts of the record 
relevant to the disposition of the exclusivity issue, are not 
sufficient as a matter of law to compel the conclusion that the 
Association lost exclusivity over all parking meter repair. The 
circumstances of this case are at least arguably distinguishable 
from those in State of New York fDMNA) . in which we held that a 
"regular and open assignment of nonunit personnel to work done by 
unit employees for a period in excess of one year constitutes a 
breach of exclusivity . . . .,,5/ Moreover, the record reflects 
other bases upon which exclusivity might have been maintained 
over at least some parking meter repair, even assuming the 
Village's occasional use of a subcontractor to do some types of 
meter repair work.47 Again, as with the AU's dismissal for 
failure of timeliness, we make no determination as to whether the 
Association has established and maintained exclusivity over all 
or any part of parking meter repair work. We hold only that the 
^27 PERB 13027, at 3068 (1994). 
^E.a., County of Onondaga. 27 PERB 13048 (1994)(incidental 
transfer of unit work); Board of Education of the City Sch. Dist. 
of the City of Long Beach. 26 PERB 13065 (1993)(transfer under 
sufferance); Town of West Seneca. 19 PERB 53028 (1986)(discernible 
boundary). 
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ALJ erred by dismissing on the merits pursuant to the Village's 
motion at the end of the Association's direct case because it 
cannot be concluded on this record as a matter of law that the 
Association lacks exclusivity over all parking meter repair work. 
For the reasons and to the extent set forth above, the ALJ's 
decision is reversed and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: November 3, 1995 
Albany, New York 
Eric J./Schmertz, Member 
2B-11/1 3/95 
STATE OE NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TROY POLICE BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE 
ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16419 
CITY OF TROY, 
Respondent. 
GLEASON, DUNN, WALSH & O'SHEA (MARK T. WALSH of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
PETER KEHOE, CORPORATION COUNSEL (BRYAN J. GOLDBERGER of 
counsel), for Respondent 
) 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of 
Troy (City) to a decision by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) on a charge filed by the 
Troy Police Benevolent and Protective Association (Association). 
After a hearing, the Director held that the City violated 
§2 09-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it unilaterally implemented a one-week lag payroll for 
employees represented by the Association and began paying them 
bi-weekly instead of weekly. 
The City has filed exceptions to the merits of the 
Director's decision and the Association has responded. After the 
exceptions and response were filed, it came to our attention that 
Board - U-16419 -2 
the Association had also filed a contract grievance on the 
subject matter of the improper practice charge and had obtained a 
favorable arbitration award which had been confirmed judicially.-' 
At our request, the Association has provided us with a copy of 
the parties7 collective bargaining agreement, the contract 
grievance, the arbitrator's opinion and award, and the decision 
and judgment of Supreme Court, Rensselaer County confirming the 
arbitration award. Each party has briefed the jurisdictional 
issues raised under §2 05.5(d) of the Act. 
Having considered the parties' arguments, we conditionally 
dismiss the charge, without reaching the merits of the Director's 
decision, pursuant to our decision in Herkimer County BOCES.-7 
Section 2 05.5(d) of the Act denies us jurisdiction over 
contract violations not otherwise constituting an improper 
practice. That jurisdictional limitation is applicable if the 
collective bargaining agreement is a reasonably arguable source 
of right to the charging party with respect to the subject matter 
of the improper practice charge.-7 The subject of both the 
improper practice charge and the contract grievance is the City's 
September 23, 1994 inter-office memorandum which effected, as 
relevant, a lag payroll and a bi-weekly payroll upon employees in 
the Association's unit. 
-'This fact was not made known to the Director. 
^20 PERB H3050 (1987). 
^County of Nassau, 23 PERB ^3051 (1990). 
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In Herkimer County BOCES, we established a jurisdictional 
deferral policy applicable in circumstances in which both a 
contract grievance and a related improper practice charge have 
been filed and are pending. In -such cases, rather than 
unconditionally dismissing the charge on jurisdictional grounds, 
as had been our practice, we determined that it would better 
serve the policies of the Act if the jurisdictional determination 
was held in abeyance pending the final disposition of the 
grievance. The City has taken an appeal from the judgment of 
Supreme Court confirming the arbitration award, potentially 
placing in issue questions concerning whether there exists a 
valid agreement between the parties and whether the arbitrator 
exceeded his power. The City's appeal automatically stays any 
enforcement of the arbitration award as confirmed and subjects 
the award to possible vacatur.. .The jurisdictional issue which is 
necessarily raised by the contract grievance, therefore, has not 
been finally determined. In such circumstances, a conditional 
dismissal of the charge pursuant to Herkimer County BOCES is 
appropriate. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED THAT the determination of PERB's 
jurisdiction over this charge is deferred, and the charge is 
conditionally dismissed, with opportunity to the Association to 
file a timely motion with us at the conclusion of the judicial 
proceedings concerning the at-issue arbitration award to reopen 
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the charge upon the ground that the jurisdictional limitation in 
§205.5(d) of the Act does not apply. 
DATED: November 3, 1995 
Albany, New York 
2 C - ] l / ' 3 / 9 5 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOSE E. GONZALEZ, 
Charging Party,-
-and- CASE NO. U-16499 
DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, AFSCME, 
Respondent, 
-and-
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
In the Matter of 
JOSE E. GONZALEZ, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16 615 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent, 
JOSE E. GONZALEZ, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by Jose Gonzalez 
to decisions by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director). The charge in U-16499 was filed by 
Gonzalez against District Council 37, AFSCME (DC 37), his 
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bargaining agent for purposes of his employment with the Board of 
Education of the City School District of the City of New York 
(District). In this charge, Gonzalez alleges that DC 37 breached 
its duty of fair representation in violation of §209-a.2(c) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) in conjunction 
with its representation of him on three grievances.-7 The 
charge in U-16615 was filed against the District and alleges that 
the District violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act, which makes it 
improper for a public employer to refuse to negotiate in good 
faith with the certified or recognized bargaining agents of its 
employees. 
The Director dismissed both charges as deficient. As 
against DC 37, the Director held that many of the allegations 
were time barred, and those that were timely were conclusory and 
did not evidence the type of arbitrary, discriminatory or bad 
faith conduct necessary to establish a breach of a union's duty 
of fair representation. Reading the charge most favorably to 
Gonzalez, the Director held that his allegations evidenced, at 
most, a difference of opinion between Gonzalez and DC 37 
regarding the nature of the grievances, how they should be 
prosecuted or argued and, as to an out-of-title work grievance, 
arguable negligence by DC 37 in failing to identify and rectify a 
hearing officer's error regarding the date that grievance had 
been filed. The Director dismissed the charge against the 
-
7The District was made a party to this charge pursuant to 
§2 09-a.3 of the Act. ' " 
Board - U-16499 & U-16615 
-3 
District on the ground that an employee has no standing to pursue 
a refusal to negotiate allegation because the statutory duty to 
bargain does not run to employees, but only to and between the 
union and the employer. 
Having considered Gonzalez' exceptions, we affirm the 
Director's dismissals. 
The charge against the District was properly dismissed as a 
matter of law for the reasons stated by the Director. Public 
employers owe a duty to negotiate in good faith only to the 
unions which are certified or recognized as the bargaining agents 
for that employer's employees.-7 
In his exceptions to the Director's dismissal of the charge 
against DC 37, Gonzalez argues that he did not intend any 
references to events occurring more than four months before his 
charge was filed on February 22, 1995 to constitute allegations 
of improper practice. Rather, he intended them only to help him 
establish the impropriety of the actions which occurred within 
four months of the date the charge was filed. If intended as 
bases of improper practices (which Gonzalez does not now claim), 
they are time barred as the Director held and were properly 
dismissed. If intended only to evidence the impropriety of 
actions taken within four months of the filing date, then they 
are relevant only as background information to those allegations 
which are timely and cognizable. 
-
7Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 
19 PERB H3006 (1986). 
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On the merits, Gonzalez argues that DC 37 failed during the 
prosecution of the grievances to offer evidence that the District 
did not follow established policies in denying him a 
promotion.-7 
Our review of Gonzalez' original pleading and the numerous 
documents submitted by him in response to the Director's 
deficiency notice shows an ongoing communication between Gonzalez 
and DC 37 regarding his promotion grievances and a sharing of 
background information relevant thereto. In those exchanges, 
Gonzalez expressed his views regarding facts and arguments 
relevant to his grievances. They further reflect DC 37's 
willingness to respond to Gonzalez' several inquiries. Having 
reviewed these materials, we reach the same conclusion as did the 
Director. There may well be a difference of opinion between 
Gonzalez and DC 3 7 regarding what should have been done, what 
should not have been done, or what should have been done 
differently with respect to his grievances. However, lest we 
substitute our judgment for a union's regarding the filing and 
prosecution of grievances, a union must be and has always been 
afforded a wide range of reasonableness in making evidentiary and 
-'Gonzalez' exceptions do not appear to be applicable to the out-
of-title work grievance which was dismissed by the District's 
hearing officer. Even if the exceptions are intended to address 
the Director's dismissal of this aspect of Gonzalez' charge, we 
would affirm for the reasons stated in the Director's decision. 
DC 37's arguable negligence in failing to identify and/or correct 
the hearing officer's alleged error does not, as a matter of law, 
constitute a breach of DC 37's duty of fair representation. See 
cases cited infra. 
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tactical decisions in these regards.^ Indeed, the United 
States Supreme Court has stated that "union discretion [in 
grievance handling] is essential to the proper functioning of the 
collective bargaining system.,,5/ The duty of fair 
representation is breached only by conduct which is arbitrary, 
discriminatory or in bad faith. Indeed, it has been widely held 
that allegations that a union has been careless, inept, 
ineffective or negligent in the investigation and presentation of 
a grievance do not evidence a breach of the union's duty of fair 
representation.-7 Adequate representation, sufficient to 
satisfy a union's duty of fair representation, has been held to 
have been afforded an employee when the basic issues underlying a 
grievance have been presented in an understandable fashion.^ 
DC 37's representation of Gonzalez was without animosity or 
other indicia of bad faith or discrimination and was sufficiently 
^See Airline Pilots v. O'Neill. 499 U.S. 65, 136 LRRM 2721 
(1991); Ford Motor Co. v. Hoffman. 345 U.S. 330, 31 LRRM 2548 
(1953). 
^IBEW V. FQUSt. 442 U.S. 42, 51, 101 LRRM 2365, 2369 (1975). 
^Smith V. Sice. 67 N.Y.2d 928 (1986); CSEA V. PERB. 132 A.D.2d 
430, 20 PERB f7024 (3d Dep't 1987), aff'd. on other grounds. 
73 N.Y.2d 796, 21 PERB f7017 (1988); Mellon v. Benker. 186 A.D.2d 
1020, 25 PERB f7534 (4th Dep't 1992); Braatz v. Mathison. 
180 A.D.2d 1007 (3d Dep't 1992); Harris v. Schwerman Trucking 
Co., 668 F.2d 1204, 109 LRRM 3135 (11th Cir. 1982); Findlev v. 
Jones Motor Freight. 639 F.2d 953, 106 LRRM 2420 (3d Cir. 1981); 
McFarland v. Teamsters, Local 745. 535 F. Supp. 970, 110 LRRM 
3022 (N.D. Texas 1982); Schleper v. Ford Motor Co.. 107 LRRM 2500 
(D. Minn. 1980); Liotta v. Nat'l Forge Co.. 473 F. Supp. 1139, 
102 LRRM 2348 (W.D. Pa. 1979),2 cert, denied. 451 U.S. 970, 107 
LRRM 2144 (1981). 
^Findley v. Jones Motor Freight, supra. 
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adequate under the prevailing standards to avoid characterization 
as arbitrary. The grievance issues were clear and relatively 
uncomplicated, as were the District's controlling policies. 
Seniority and qualifications are factors in promotions to the at-
issue position. What is evidenced is merely a disagreement 
between the District and Gonzalez regarding the interpretation 
and application of those policies. Apparently, Gonzalez believes 
that a junior employee must be promoted if better qualified by 
education than a senior employee, while the District believes 
that seniority controls provided the applicant has the minimally 
necessary educational qualifications. The District may have been 
incorrect in reaching its conclusion, but a mistaken 
interpretation or application of its policies does not evidence 
or establish that DC 37's representation of Gonzalez on his 
grievance fell below the minimally acceptable level. The 
District's hearing officers denied the grievances upon concluding 
that the promotion of employees who were senior to Gonzalez and 
who had satisfactory service records was fully consistent with 
the District's promotional policies. Gonzalez may consider 
himself better qualified for promotion than the employees who 
were promoted, but his belief in that respect does not evidence 
or establish that the District's contrary belief was wrong or 
that DC 37 violated its duty toward him in presenting the 
grievances to the District's hearing officers. 
Board - U-16499 & U-16615 
For the reasons set forth 
denied and the Director's decii 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED 
hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: November 3, 1995 
Albany, New York 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TROY POLICE BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE 
ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14729 
CITY OF TROY, 
Respondent. 
GLEASON, DUNN, WALSH & O'SHEA (MARK T. WALSH Of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
PETER R. KEHOE, CORPORATION COUNSEL (MATTHEW TURNER Of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Troy Police 
Benevolent and Protective Association (PBA) to a decision by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director). After a hearing, the Director dismissed the PBA's 
charge against the City of Troy (City) which alleges that the 
City violated §2 09-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by establishing a panel of attorneys and a 
maximum attorney-fee schedule to implement its contractual 
obligation to provide legal representation to police officers who 
face civil claims arising out of service-related incidents. The 
Director dismissed the charge for lack of jurisdiction pursuant 
to §205.5(d) of the Act on the ground that Article XXIX(2) of the 
parties' contract is a source of right to the PBA with respect to 
Board - U-14729 -2 
the issue raised in its improper practice charge. Article 
XXIX(2) provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
In the event that a police officer is faced 
with a civil claim arising out of an incident 
related to his service with the Bureau, the 
City will provide legal counsel for his 
protection and hold him harmless from any 
financial loss.including punitive damages 
pursuant to and as provided for in Section 
50-j of the General Municipal Law. 
The PBA claims that the Director erred in dismissing the 
charge for lack of jurisdiction and failed to distinguish our 
decision in County of Nassau,-/ which he cited in support of his 
decision. The City has not filed a response to the exceptions. 
Section 205.5(d) of the Act does not accord us jurisdiction 
over contract violations not otherwise constituting an improper 
practice. Since at least County of Nassau,^ we have 
consistently found the jurisdictional limitation in §205.5(d) 
applicable if the collective bargaining agreement is a reasonably-
arguable source of right to the charging party with respect to 
the subject matter of the improper practice charge. Article 
XXIX(2) is clearly a source of right of legal defense for unit 
employees. As we also observed in County of Nassau, the contours 
of the charging party's contract rights and the respondent's 
^26 PERB 53052 (1993). 
-
723 PERB ^3051 (1990). The Director's citation was to that case 
after remand and concerns waiver issues, not jurisdictional 
issues. As cited, it is not relevant to the basis for his 
decision or ours. 
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corresponding obligations need not be laid out in any detail to 
trigger the jurisdictional limitation in §205.5(d). 
In this case, as the PBA itself notes, the contract is a 
"grant of right to the PBA members" which fixes and defines the 
nature and the extent of the "obligation upon the City" with 
respect to legal defense by reference to General Municipal Law 
§50-j. It may be, as the PBA itself claimed in an earlier 
grievance which was never arbitrated,-7 that Article XXIX(2) 
affords a police officer, at least in a case involving a 
potential conflict of interest with the City, a right to select 
his or her own attorney without relevant limitation. The 
contract alternatively may leave the choice of counsel and the 
terms applicable thereto to the City. An interpretation of the 
contract reflecting variations or combinations of the parties7 
positions is also possible. We express no opinion as to the 
proper interpretation of the parties' rights and obligations 
under Article XXIX(2). The merits of the parties' arguments 
regarding the nature and the. extent of their rights and 
obligations under the contract are not material to the 
jurisdictional dismissal necessitated by §205.5(d) of the Act. A 
primary purpose of §2 05.5(d) of the Act is to prevent us from 
interpreting collective bargaining agreements except as necessary 
-
7The jurisdictional issue is, therefore, presented to us for 
consideration. Compare our deferral this date of a 
jurisdictional issue in another case involving these parties. In 
that other case, a grievance had been arbitrated and that award 
was neither in effect nor final because of an appeal by the City 
from a judgment confirming the award. 
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to the proper exercise of our improper practice jurisdiction. 
The controlling point is that the parties already have an 
agreement regarding the legal defense that must be afforded to 
police officers by the City. There is provided in the agreement 
both the right to counsel and the standard by which the grant is 
to be controlled, i.e., General Municipal Law §50-j. The 
contract being a source of right to the PBA with respect to the 
City's designation of an attorney panel and its establishment of 
a fee schedule for services rendered by attorneys to police 
officers, the Director was required to dismiss the charge for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
For the reasons set forth above, the PBA's exceptions are 
denied and the charge must be, and hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 3, 1995 
Albany, New York 
2 F ~ n / h 3/95 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ANTONIO JENKINS, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U«15092 
NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION and 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondents. 
ANTONIO JENKINS, pro se 
THOMAS A. LIESE, ESQ., for New York City Board of 
Education 
JAMES R. SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEWART LIPKIND of 
counsel), for United Federation of Teachers 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Antonio Jenkins 
to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). After a 
hearing, the ALJ dismissed the charge filed against Jenkins' 
employer, the New York City Board of Education (BOE), and his 
bargaining agent, the United Federation of Teachers (UFT), which 
alleges, respectively, violations of §209-a.l(a), (b) and (c) and 
§209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act). The charge against the BOE was dismissed as untimely and, 
alternatively, on the merits, upon the ALJ's finding that no 
evidence was presented to link the allegedly improper conduct and 
any exercise of statutorily protected right or to establish the 
BOE's interference with or domination of the UFT. The breach of 
Board - U-15092 -2 
duty of fair representation allegations against the UFT were 
dismissed by the ALJ on her finding that the UFT's representation 
of Jenkins in conjunction with the settlement of a grievance 
regarding an unsatisfactory rating given him by the BOE was in 
complete good faith. 
Jenkins received the ALJ's decision on May 2, 1995, and he 
filed his exceptions by mail on May 24, 1995. Section 204.10 of 
our Rules of Procedure requires exceptions to be filed within 
fifteen working days after receipt of an ALJ's decision. 
Excluding the day of receipt from the calculation, Jenkins' 
exceptions had to be filed by May 23, 1995, making them late by 
one day. The BOE in its response objects to our consideration of 
the exceptions because they were not timely filed.-7 
Our filing rules have been strictly construed. When raised 
by a party, noncompliance with the time limits for filing has 
resulted in a dismissal of exceptions.-7 Having been untimely 
filed, Jenkins' exceptions are not properly before us. 
Even were we to reach the merits of these exceptions, 
however, we would affirm the ALJ's decision for the reasons set 
forth therein. Jenkins' allegations against the BOE are untimely 
or are deficient as a matter of fact or law as explained in the 
ALJ's decision. Many of Jenkins' exceptions directed to the 
-
7The BOE is a party to the duty of fair representation aspects 
of the charge pursuant to §2 09-a.3 of the Act. 
2/See, e.g. , City of Albany, 23 PERB ?[3027 (1990) , conf'd, 
181 A.D.2d 953, 25 PERB ^7002 (3d Dep't 1992). 
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ALJ's dismissal of the allegations against the UFT are either 
unintelligible, are not encompassed within the charge as filed, 
or raise breach of contract allegations beyond our jurisdiction. 
In all other respects, there is nothing in the record to evidence 
the arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith conduct which would 
constitute a breach of the UFT's duty of fair representation. 
Jenkins, facing serious allegations of job misconduct, knowingly 
entered into a settlement agreement which gave him a clean record 
and ultimately allowed him to obtain another job within the BOE, 
an agreement which he considered at the time to be in his best 
interest. His obligations under the settlement agreement were 
adequately, if not completely, explained to him by the UFT and 
any claimed noncompliance by the BOE or misunderstandings were 
promptly clarified and corrected by the UFT when Jenkins brought 
such claims to its attention. The duty of fair representation 
required nothing more of UFT's representatives. 
For the reasons set forth above, Jenkins7 exceptions are 
denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 3, 1995 
Albany, New York 
2F-HA3/95 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HAMMONDSPORT NON-TEACHING PERSONNEL 
ORGANIZATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15607 
HAMMONDSPORT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JOHN B. SCHAMEL, for Charging Party 
MURRY P. SOLOMON, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the 
Hammondsport Non-Teaching Personnel Organization (Organization) 
to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). After a 
hearing, the ALJ dismissed the Organization's charge against the 
Hammondsport Central School District (District) which, as 
relevant to the exceptions, alleges that the District violated 
§2 09-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
serving Pizza Hut pizzas to students for school lunch on 
April 13, 1994. The ALJ held that the Organization did not have 
exclusivity over the making of pizzas and, therefore, the 
District had no duty to bargain with it regarding the decision in 
issue. 
The Organization argues in its exceptions that the work 
involved in Pizza Hut's making of pizzas is different from the 
Board - U-15607 -2 
work involved when other nonunit personnel have made pizzas on 
premises or other circumstances in which pizzas made elsewhere 
have been served to students. The District argues in response 
that the ALJ's decision must be -affirmed both because there is no 
exclusivity over the work in issue and because the "Pizza Hut 
Day" was a one-time experiment which did not effect any 
permanent, temporary or substantial transfer of unit work. 
Having reviewed the record and the parties' arguments, we 
affirm the ALJ's decision. 
In essence, the Organization argues that the District may 
not for even one day serve pizzas to students unless those pizzas 
are either wholly or substantially made by unit employees, or are 
made by nonunit personnel on District premises with ingredients 
the District has purchased and stored. The record establishes, 
as the ALJ found, that the Organization does not have exclusivity 
over making pizzas. Persons outside the unit have in the past 
made pizzas which have been served to students after baking or 
reheating. There is nothing in this record which would warrant 
the definition of unit work or the recognition of a discernible 
boundary thereto which would effect the prohibition the 
Organization seeks. As did the ALJ, we express no opinion about 
whether transfers of other types or aspects of food preparation, 
or of the same type under different circumstances, would be 
subject to a decisional bargaining obligation. 
We would add that this litigation involves labor relations 
issues which are not perhaps self-apparent. Seemingly minor 
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transfers of unit work might jeopardize a union's maintenance of 
exclusivity over unit work. With a loss of exclusivity, 
subsequent major transfers of unit work might not be subject to a 
duty to bargain. Even though the Organization's charge is from 
this perspective understandable, this litigation could have and 
should have been avoided through discussion and agreement between 
the parties. Efforts were undertaken by them in that regard, but 
were abandoned once positions hardened after an exchange of 
correspondence. Without singling out either party for blame, 
this intransigence is not consistent with the policy of the Act 
to promote harmonious and cooperative bargaining relationships. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Organization's 
exceptions are denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 3, 1995 
Albany, New York 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of • • 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16030 
SMITHTOWN FIRE DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN A. CRAIN of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
ENGLANDER & ALBERT, P.C. (WILLIAM H. ENGLANDER of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing, for failure to prosecute, CSEA's improper practice 
charge alleging that the Smithtown Fire District (District) had 
violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public Employees7 Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by refusing to assign overtime to a unit 
employee because he exercised rights protected by the Act. 
The assigned ALJ sent a notice of conference to CSEA and the 
District scheduling the matter for a pre-hearing conference on 
January 12, 1995. The District's attorney appeared but CSEA's 
Board - U-16030 -2 
designated representative failed to attend. When finally 
contacted by telephone, he told the ALJ that, notwithstanding the 
date and time specified in the ALJ's scheduling letter, he 
thought the conference had been scheduled for a different time 
and had confirmed that time with a staff person at PERB's 
Brooklyn office. The ALJ then informed the CSEA representative 
that the charge would be dismissed if he failed to appear for 
another conference. By letter dated January 24, 1995, the ALJ 
gave the CSEA representative an opportunity to file an affidavit 
explaining his absence from the January 12 conference. Upon 
receipt of the representative's explanation and apology, the ALJ, 
on March 14, 1995, sent a letter to the CSEA representative and 
the District's attorney rescheduling the conference to May 5, 
1995. Once again, the District's attorney appeared on May 5 as 
scheduled, but the CSEA representative did not. The ALJ 
contacted the representative's office, which then located him, 
and he told the ALJ orally that he did not have the conference 
scheduled. The representative was advised by the ALJ that the 
District would be filing a motion to which he could respond. On 
May 5, 1995, the District filed a motion to dismiss, citing 
CSEA's failure to prosecute and further alleging that the charge 
was untimely on its face. CSEA did not respond to the motion. 
The ALJ dismissed the charge, concluding that CSEA's 
representative had failed to comply with PERB's procedures and 
processes and had imposed a burden on both PERB's and the 
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District's time and resources. As an alternative ground for 
dismissal, the ALJ held the charge to be untimely. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in 
dismissing the charge because the District's representative had 
requested and received several adjournments of the pre-hearing 
conference, which caused the CSEA representative to become 
confused about the actual date for the conference, the CSEA 
representative and the CSEA attorney had not received the ALJ's 
letter scheduling the May 5 conference, and that the charge is 
not untimely. According to its exceptions, CSEA did not respond 
to the motion to dismiss because its attorney did not receive a 
copy of the District's motion. The District supports the ALJ's 
decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
Section 204.6 of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) provides 
that the failure of a party to appear at a pre-hearing conference 
may, in the discretion of the ALJ, constitute ground for 
dismissal of the absent party's pleading. Unless the ALJ's 
dismissal of the charge evidences an abuse of discretion based on 
the record before the ALJ, there is no basis to reverse the 
decision. Here, in addition to failing to appear, CSEA failed to 
submit any response to the District's motion to dismiss upon that 
ground, which its designated representative, Stanley Frere, does 
not deny receiving. Therefore, the only information that the ALJ 
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had to rely upon in making his decision was the CSEA 
representative's oral representation on May 5 that he was not 
present at that day's conference because he did not have it 
scheduled. Because CSEA never responded to the motion to 
dismiss, the ALJ did not have the benefit when he issued his 
decision of the arguments CSEA makes for the first time in its 
exceptions.-7 Based on the record before him, we do not find 
that the ALJ abused his discretion in dismissing CSEA's pleading 
pursuant to the express terms of our Rules. 
We do not decide whether the other arguments raised by CSEA 
for the first time in its exceptions would warrant a contrary 
conclusion. We have held on numerous occasions that we will not 
consider allegations of fact made for the first time in 
exceptions when reviewing an ALJ's decision because our review is 
limited to the record as it was developed before the ALJ.& 
^CSEA's allegation in its exceptions that its attorney should 
have received a copy of the rescheduling letter and the 
District's motion to dismiss is rejected. On its notice of 
appearance in this matter, CSEA gives the name of its labor 
relations specialist as the representative to whom all 
correspondence is to be sent until the matter is ready for 
hearing. Its attorney is listed on the notice of appearance as 
the representative to be contacted at such time as the matter is 
ready for a stipulated record or a hearing. No allegation is 
made that the transfer of appearance had been triggered by either 
event. 
^Town of Greece. 26 PERB 53004 (1993); Civil Service Employees 
Ass'n. Inc. (Reese), 25 PERB f3012 (1992); Manhasset Union Free 
Sch. Dist.r 24 PERB 53003 (1991); Margolin v. Newman. 130 A.D.2d 
312, 20 PERB f7018 (3d Dep't 1987), appeal dismissed. 71 N.Y.2d 
844, 21 PERB f7005 (1988). 
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We, therefore, deny the exceptions filed by CSEA and affirm 
the decision of the ALJ.-7 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 3, 1995 
Albany, New York 
U-j^  1 .bJ k*S. 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric J/. Schmertz, Membe 
-'Based on our decision, we need not reach the other grounds 
given by the ALJ for dismissal of the charge. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4248 
ROCHESTER PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All part-time employees in the following 
titles: Librarian I, Librarian II, Library 
Assistant, Clerk I, Clerk II, Clerk Ill/Typist, 
Clerk IV, Secretary/Typist, Cleaner, Stock 
Clerk, Security Guard, Clerk/Typist, Shipping 
Aide. 
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Excluded: Pages and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: November 3, 1995 
Albany, New York 
m~ ~^ Pauline R.-'Kinsella, Chairperson 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED 
INDUSTRY WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 42 4, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4358 
SOUTH HUNTINGTON UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
LOCAL 144, DIVISION 100, SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424, has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
Certification - C-4358 
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exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: Permanent full-time employees in 
the following categories: 
custodians, head custodians, chief 
custodian, maintenance, 
instructional media, grounds, and 
matrons. Full-time/part-time 
employees in the following 
categories: bus transportation and 
bus maintenance. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council Local 424. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and. 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: November 3, 1995 
Albany, New York 1. 1^-4^ jL „WVMU 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric J/ Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4423 
TOWN OF CORNING, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Motor equipment operators. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
Certification - C-4423 
- 2 -
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions- of employment-,-- or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: November 3, 1995 
Albany, New York 
J:-f> 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson &r. 
Erizf"'J- Schmer t z , Melnber 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4426 
CITY OF SYRACUSE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: School Crossing Guards. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
Certification - C-4426 
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shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
-other terms-and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of --
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: November 3, 1995 
Albany, New York 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4447 
UTICA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules' of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that'the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424 has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: DART drivers. 
Certification - C-4447 
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Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: November 3, 1995 
Albany, New York 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4450 
SOUTH HUNTINGTON UNION FREE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424 has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and regularly scheduled.part-time 
Certification - C-4450 
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security guards. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A-Division ..of .United...Industry. Workers. 
District Council 424. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: November 3, 1995 
Albany, New York 
